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One of the most important jobs of the legislature in any country is to
decide how to allocate government resources.  Legislative bargaining
models attempt to explain how legislators bargain with each other to get
resources for their own constituencies. 
To test these models, social scientists conduct legislative bargaining
experiments in which players representing a legislative party make
different proposals for splitting a finite budget, and then bargain with 
each other until they come to an agreement. 
In the past, legislative bargaining experiments have measured only how
the financial pie is split among the competing stakeholders -– in other
words, they have looked only at how much each player wins for his or her
own constituency.  In this way, they have examined only the dimension of
particularistic goods, or goods allocated for a special interest.
In this project, Kagel and Morelli examine legislative bargaining on two
dimensions -– particularistic goods and collective goods, or public interest
goods that benefit society as a whole.  To do this, they are running two
sets of experiments. 
In the first set, all players valued particularistic goods more highly than
public goods.  Standard game theory predicted that these players would
allocate little for collective goods; however, Kagel and Morelli found the
opposite.  This is because in order to secure votes for their own special
interests, players had to provide something in return by voting to support
the public good. 
Standard game theory also predicted that when players place lower value
on collective goods, they would need to offer more collective goods to
have their proposals accepted.  However, Kagel and Morelli again found
the opposite to be true, because of a strong “reference point effect.”
In the second set of experiments, different players placed differing values
on particularistic vs. public goods.  Here again, Kagel and Morelli found
surprising results.  Players in a minority had to make proposals that
appealed to majority players, resulting in coalitions that cut across
preference lines, or “strange bedfellows.”
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Past Mershon funding of Kagel’s legislative bargaining experiments has led
to publication of four articles in top research journals.  Kagel and Morelli
presented results from this set of experiments at the Coalition Theory
Network workshop in January 2007, and planned to submit a paper to a
major journal soon after.
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